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SOCIAL AUTHORITY: OBTAINING, EVALUATING, AND
ESTABLISHING SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW
JOHN MONAHANt AND LAURENS WALKERt
INTRODUCTION
Three-quarters of a century have passed since an American court
first invoked social science research to support its choice of a rule of
law.' Once heretical, the belief that empirical studies can influence the
content of legal doctrine is now one of the few points of general agree-
ment among jurists.2 Yet reliance upon the social sciences, while no
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dent assistants David Faigman, Ann Peldo, Susan Simmonds, Molly Fields, Martin
Willard, and Richard Choi for their research. This article was written while Professor
Monahan was a Fellow of the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation.
That case was Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
2 All nine current Justices of the United States Supreme Court have either au-
thored or joined opinions using social science research to establish or criticize a rule of
law. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984) (opinion of Justice White
citing sociological field research to support a "good faith" exception to the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 916 (1983) (dissent-
ing opinion of Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, using psy-
chological and psychiatric research to support the proposition that a state statute predi-
(477)
478 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
longer remarkable, is less evident in modern judicial opinions than
might be expected, given the force of the underlying conviction that
"'we are all realists now.' "' Apparently, a series of practical problems
has seriously constrained judicial use of this potentially rich legal re-
source. Obtaining social science research has been cumbersome and
sometimes controversial; evaluating research has been frustrating and
uncertain; and establishing stable judicial views of particular empirical
findings has proven elusive.
We contend that these problems stem largely from an early and
unfortunate determination that social science materials should be
treated as "facts," even when used to formulate a rule of law. Uncriti-
cal acceptance of this categorization has led lawyers and judges to sub-
ject empirical research to procedural rules and practices that often fail
to produce useful results. In this Article we advance the thesis that
social science research, when used to create a legal rule, is more analo-
gous to "law" than to "fact," and hence should be treated much as
courts treat legal precedent. This fundamental shift to a perspective
that considers empirical data as "social authority" reveals a novel and
theoretically coherent view of the entire range of procedures that law-
yers and judges should use to manage social science information.
Adopting this perspective, we make specific proposals for obtaining,
evaluating, and establishing in court the findings of empirical research.
Though our thesis may appear radical, our proposals will prove limit-
ing; over the short term, the volume of social science relied on by courts
probably will decrease, while over the long term, a small body of high
quality social science will be established and available for efficient judi-
cial reference.
In Part I we describe and account for the original view of social
cating capital punishment on a prediction of continuing violence is unconstitutional);
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 519 (1983) (dissenting opinion of Justice Rehnquist,
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor, in which sociological surveys
were cited to support the use of a "drug courier profile" in establishing reasonable
suspicion for a search); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982)
(opinion of Justice O'Connor citing sociological surveys to establish the unconstitution-
ality of a state statute that excluded males from enrolling in a state-supported nursing
school); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (opinion of Justice Blackmun, joined
by Justice Stevens, citing psychological laboratory studies to establish the unconstitu-
tionality of five-member juries in state criminal trials); United States v. Martinez-Fu-
erte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (opinion by Justice Powell citing epidemiological and demo-
graphic research to support the constitutionality of fixed checkpoint stops of vehicles at
borders); Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (opinion of Chief Justice
Burger using behavioral studies to support the constitutionality of a state obscenity
statute).




science research as fact. Surprising hints appear in the early cases that
a "social authority" orientation would have been acceptable, although
the "fact" perspective ultimately came to dominate. In Part II we con-
tend that' social science research can plausibly be seen as a form of
authority, in much the same way as prior cases are regarded by the
common law, and demonstrate that similar materials are already used
as authority in several areas of the law. In Part III we examine the
judicial implications of considering empirical research as social author-
ity. We advance specific proposals for obtaining social science research
in court, recommend principal criteria for its evaluation, and present
situations in which courts should consider establishing stable judicial
views of individual research findings. By abandoning the original view
of social science research as fact and adopting a new theory of "social
authority," courts can solve the severe problems that have impeded ju-
dicial access to high quality social science information."
I. SOCIAL SCIENCE AS FACT
A. The "Fact" Classification
At the turn of this century, American law was dominated by clas-
sical jurisprudence-the belief that a single, correct legal solution could
be reached in every case by the application of logic to a set of natural,
self-evident principles. Classical jurisprudence understood the process
of deciding cases to be purely rational and exclusively deductive and
thus produced a formal and mechanical approach to decisionmaking'
Such was the pervasive climate of opinion when James Bradley
Thayer provided, for his time, a definitive description of the law-fact
distinction.' Thayer defined "questions of law" to include only the
problem of choosing between competing rules; all other questions were
" Although the proposals in this Article may be relevant to the use of other types
of scientific evidence in the courts, we limit our suggestions to the social sciences be-
cause this is the area of our interest and experience. By social science we mean the
application of empirical research methods to questions of human behavior. The social
sciences constitute a partial, though surely significant, use of science in the courts. See
generally J. MONAHAN & L. WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES & MATERI-
ALS (1985) (discussing the actual and potential use of the social sciences in the Ameri-
can legal process).
I See Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 607 (1908). For
more recent descriptions, see E. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 74-
75 (1973); White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and
Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REv. 999, 1001-02
(1972); Woodard, The Limits of Legal Realism: An Historical Perspective, 54 VA. L.
REV. 689, 699-701, 710-18 (1968).
6 J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW
183-262 (1898).
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"questions of fact." Thayer and his contemporary, Christopher Colum-
bus Langdell, 7 saw "law" as permanent and general, and consequently
regarded any material that seemed either transitory or particular as
necessarily "fact." According to classical jurisprudence, law did not
change, so any demonstrably changeable material had to be "fact" or
else the concept of law risked "embarrassment.""
This was the intellectual context in which Louis Brandeis pre-
pared his brief for the State in Muller v. Oregon.9 Brandeis assembled
a substantial body of medical and social science research tending to
show the debilitating effect on women of working long hours, and
presented this material to the Court in his brief defending Oregon's
limits on the number of hours women could work. It is not surprising,
given Thayer's distinction and the jurisprudence of the time, that Bran-
deis himself referred to the social science material as "facts." ' The
problem of choosing between two rules was not addressed by these
materials; nor did the materials claim permanence. They did not con-
tend that working long hours always had and always would harm
women, only that such an effect had occurred at one point in history.
This temporality, or changeability, mandated the fact classification.
The response of the Supreme Court is intriguing. After referring
to the social science materials, the Court stated that although they
"may not be, technically speaking, authorities,"11 they would nonethe-
7 See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 353 (1973) (discussing how
Langdell, champion of the case method in legal studies, believed that the common law
contained true legal principles that could be derived from cases).
8 For an analysis of Thayer's view, see Morris, Law and Fact, 55 HARV. L.
REV. 1303 (1942). Morris concluded that
Thayer worked in a climate of opinion. His was a time when the creative
aspects of judges' work [were] depreciated. The fashion of his day was to
consider rules alone worthy of the dignity of the name, law. Facts are
transitory and particular. To call problems that are transitory and partic-
ular 'questions of fact' prevented embarrassment of the permanency and
generality of the law.
Id. at 1315.
9 208 U.S. 412 (1908). In 1903, the Oregon state legislature enacted a statute that
limited the work day of any woman or girl employed in a factory or a laundry to 10
hours. In 1905, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of a laundry owner
who had violated this statute, and the owner appealed to the United States Supreme
Court. For a historical retrospective of this landmark case, see Collins & Friesen, Look-
ing Back on Muller v. Oregon, 69 A.B.A. J. 294, 294-95 (1983).
'0 Brief for the Defendant in Error at 113, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412
(1908) ("We submit that in view of thefacts above set forth. . . it cannot be said that
the Legislature of Oregon has no reasonable ground for believing that the public
health, safety, or welfare did not require a legal limitation on women's work ... "
(emphasis added).
11 208 U.S. at 420 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 134:477
SOCIAL AUTHORITY
less receive "judicial cognizance."112 This phrase could indicate that,
even in the jurisprudential climate of 1908, some members of the Court
believed that only "technicalities" prevented them from viewing social
science research as a form of authority."3 But such a belief, if held, did
not prevail. Further in the opinion, the Court clearly returned to the
classical perspective and referred to the materials as presenting a ques-
tion of fact.
1 4
By the 1930's, classifying social science as fact was deeply in-
grained in the thinking of the Court.'5 Yet, the routine treatment of
12 Id. at 421.
13 The Court did not state the nature of these "technicalities," but one possibility
is the then still powerful force of formal jurisprudence, articulated as a general re-
straint on judicial behavior.
14 See 208 U.S. at 421-23. In the decades after Muller, social science studies con-
tinued to play a significant role in deciding major constitutional cases, particularly in
the area of wage-and-hour law. Courts uniformly branded these studies as facts, appar-
ently without analysis or reflection. For example, in a New York case, People v.
Charles Schweinler Press, 214 N.Y. 395, 108 N.E. 83 (1915), the court conducted a
lengthy review of the findings of medical and industrial investigations before it upheld
the constitutionality of legislation limiting the hours that women could work. "[S]uch
facts, evidence and information furnished a sufficient reason for action by the legisla-
ture," the Court concluded. Id. at 404. The United States Supreme Court employed the
same characterization of social science evidence to support the constitutionality of a ten-
hour workday for mill employees. See Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917). The
Court found that "knowledge obtained by the increasing study of industrial conditions"
was sufficient to provide a rational basis for the legislation. Id. at 433. "These are facts
of common knowledge of which this court will take judicial notice." Id. Similarly, the
Court relied on "the facts of life" to strike down a child labor law. Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 253 (1918).
The Court also struck down a minimum wage law in Adkins v. Children's Hosp.,
261 U.S. 525 (1923). It dismissed a "mass of reports, opinions of special observers and
students of the subject, and the like," which supported the economic advantages of the
minimum wage, as interesting but only mildly persuasive. Id. at 560. The Court rested
its decision on the "notorious fact that earnings everywhere in all occupations have
greatly increased" with or without minimum legislation. Id. A year later, in Burns
Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924), the Court similarly voided regulations con-
trolling the weight of loaves of bread. In dissent, Justice Brandeis reported a lengthy
personal investigation into the practices of the baking industry. He concluded that the
empirical evidence supported the rationality of the weight regulations and stated, "[plut
at its highest, our function is to determine, in light of all facts which may enrich our
knowledge and enlarge our understanding, whether the measure ...transcends the
bounds of reason." Id. at 534 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Using the same view in Bor-
den's Farm Prods. Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194 (1934), Chief Justice Hughes, writing
for the majority, upheld the constitutionality of legislation regulating the milk industry.
He observed that when the justification for a law "is predicated upon the particular
economic facts of a given trade or industry, which are outside the sphere of judicial
notice, these facts are properly the subject of evidence and of findings." Id. at 210.
" The Court relied on "experience" for the proposition that the right to unionize
and collectively bargain was an essential condition for preserving industrial peace. See
NLRB. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 42 (1937) ("This is such an
outstanding fact in the history of labor disturbances that it is a proper subject of judi-
cial notice and requires no citation of instances."). One year earlier, the Court had
refused to overrule Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), and struck down
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social research as fact did not account for the anomalous practice Bran-
deis had initiated in the Muller case. How could Brandeis briefs be
submitted initially to the Supreme Court without having the facts first
tested by the confrontational procedures of a trial court?
B. The "Legislative /Adjudicative" Distinction
Early criticism of classical jurisprudence eventually led to a radical
revolt against formalism by the Realists. Karl Llewellyn provided the
best summary of what he called the Realists' "common points of depar-
ture." 6 He wrote that Realists conceived of the law as constantly "in
flux" as judges created and discarded law to meet social needs.17 Obvi-
ously, this position diametrically opposed the classicalists' idea of an
immutable law, with all else consigned by simple elimination to the
category of fact. By legitimizing the concept of change in the law, the
Realists found legal relevance in a much broader spectrum of sources
than Thayer would have allowed.
It was against this background of fundamental jurisprudential
change that, in 1942, Kenneth Culp Davis published an article that
brought to the fore latent dissatisfaction with the existing division be-
tween law and fact. 8 Davis proposed what proved to be a highly influ-
another minimum wage law. See Moorehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S.
587 (1936). Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Moorehead, however, recog-
nized social science data as providing a "factual" foundation for their views. Reviewing
the factual background of the law, the majority found that "[t]hese legislative declara-
tions, in the form of findings or recitals of fact, serve well to illustrate why any measure
that deprives employers and adult women of freedom to agree upon wages . . . is nec-
essarily arbitrary." Id. at 615-16. In dissent, Chief Justice Hughes pointed to the
state's "voluminous factual brief for the purpose of showing from various official statis-
tics that these recitals have abundant support." Id. at 625 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
After a lengthy review of those statistics, the dissent concluded simply, "We are not at
liberty to disregard these facts." Id. at 627.
18 Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44
HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1235 (1931).
17 Id. at 1236.
18 See Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Pro-
cess, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Davis, An Approach to
Problems of Evidence]. Davis originally focused upon the problem of developing appro-
priate techniques for managing evidence in the administrative process. He argued that
the then-burgeoning federal administrative agencies should not indiscriminately apply
rules of evidence developed for common-law jury trials to their decisionmaking tasks.
Id. at 365. He suggested a number of principles for the development of evidentiary
practices in administrative decisionmaking that take into account the needs of the agen-
cies, the differences between agencies and courts, and the fact that many administrative
proceedings are nonadversarial and are conducted by experts. See id. at 367-423. Many
of Davis's principles rest on the distinction he made between adjudicative and legisla-
tive facts, see id. at 423-25, a distinction he still maintains is valid and useful. See K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 15.1 (2d ed. 1980); DavisJudicial Notice,
55 COLUM. L. REV. 945 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Davis, Judicial Notice]; Davis,
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ential distinction between "adjudicative facts"-facts that pertain spe-
cifically to the case at bar-and "legislative facts"-facts involved in
deciding questions of law or policy.1" This distinction was a clear indi-
cation that the Realists had succeeded in undercutting the classical per-
spective on the nature of law. Davis's candid recognition of a judicial
lawmaking function paralleled Realist views. Similarly, his recognition
that facts are a component of lawmaking directly contradicted the clas-
sical position that law was deductively discovered rather than judicially
created.
In the dozen years following its coinage by Davis, the distinction
between legislative and adjudicative facts received approval from com-
mentators who recognized that the distinction had application well be-
yond the boundaries of administrative law.20 Yet, in Brown v. Board of
Education,2" when the Supreme Court had its next major encounter
with social science materials, it did not invoke Davis's distinction.
Rather, the Court referred to the social science studies that supported
the district court's finding that segregated public education harmed
black children as "modern authority."22 The Court simply cited the
studies seriatim in a footnote,23 much as it would list case citations sup-
Facts in Lawmaking, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Davis,
Facts].
19 Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence, supra note 18, at 402. Davis
commented that
[w]hen an agency finds facts concerning immediate parties-what the par-
ties did, what the circumstances were, what the background conditions
were-the agency is performing an adjudicative function, and the facts
may conveniently be called adjudicative facts. When an agency wrestles
with a question of law or policy, it is acting legislatively, just as judges
have created the common law through judicial legislation, and the facts
which inform its legislative judgment may conveniently be denominated
legislative facts.
Id.
More recently, Davis has stated that "[t]he distinction between adjudicative and
legislative facts should be essentially one between facts about particular immediate par-
ties and all other facts . . . ." K. DAVIS, supra note 18, at 143.
20 See E. CLEARY, K. BROUN, G. Dix, E. GELHORN, D. KAYE, R. MEISEN-
HOLDER, E. ROBERTS & J. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 328 (3d ed. 1984)
[hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE]; Morris, supra note 8, at 1318-25;
Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1281,
1295 (1952). In a complementary manner, the proposals of this article, though devel-
oped with immediate reference to social science in the courts, may be usefully applied
in the administrative law process as well.
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
22 Id. at 494.
23 Id. at 494 n. 11. This reference to "modern authority" has not escaped substan-
tial criticism. See, e.g., Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150 (1955); Good-
man, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60
CALIF. L. REV. 275, 279 (1972); Van den Haag, Social Science Testimony in the De-
segregation Cases: A Reply to Professor Kenneth Clark, 6 VILL. L. REv. 69 (1960).
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porting a proposition of law.
Empirical research, which in 1908 the Muller Court had said
"may not be, technically speaking, authorities," had by 1954 in Brown
come to be described, and used, as "modern authority. 2 4 But in Brown
as in Muller, the allusion that scientific research might be considered
authority rather than fact was fleeting and never pursued. During the
three decades since Brown, the distinction between legislative fact and
adjudicative fact has achieved widespread acceptance.25
24 We realize, of course, that the purpose to which social science research was put
differed significantly in the two cases. In Muller, empirical data were used to support
the rationality of a state statute. In Brown, they were used to overrule a prior Supreme
Court. decision. See infra text accompanying notes 123-30.
11 See, e.g., Concerned Citizens v. Pine Creek Conservancy Dist., 429 U.S. 651,
657 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("As Mr. Justice Holmes recognized, the deter-
mination of legislative facts does not necessarily implicate the same considerations as
does the determination of adjudicative facts."); National Org. of Women v. Social Sec.
Admin., 736 F.2d 727, 737 n.95 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("The distinction between adjudica-
tive and legislative facts is now well-recognized . . . ."); cf. Broz v. Schweiker, 677
F.2d 1351, 1357 (11th Cir. 1982) (noting that "[tihe legislative/adjudicative fact dis-
tinction, first articulated by Professor Davis ...has become a cornerstone of modern
administrative law theory and has been widely accepted in the federal appellate
courts"); Association of Nat'l Advertisers v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1162 n.20 (D.C. Cir.
1979) ("The distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts has been widely ac-
cepted both within and without this circuit."), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980). Da-
vis's distinction has also proved useful in the context of criminal appeals. See United
States v. Bowers, 660 F.2d 527, 531 (5th Cir. 1981) (using the distinction to uphold the
court's instructions to the jury that judicial notice was taken of jurisdiction); United
States v. Gould, 536 F.2d 216, 220 (8th Cir. 1976) (relying on the distinction between
legislative and adjudicative facts in upholding the district court's use of judicial notice
in deciding that cocaine hydrochloride was subject to federal drug control laws).
Commentators, however, have expressed doubts about the usefulness of the distinc-
tion. See, e.g., Clagett, Informal Action-Adjudication-Rulemaking: Some Recent Devel-
opments in Federal Administrative Law, 1971 DUKE L.J. 51, 80 (noting that "the
distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts may have done more harm than
good and that even if a fact can clearly be classified as one or the other, that classifica-
tion alone sheds very little-if any-light on what procedures are most appropriate for
resolving the issue"); McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Adminis-
trative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and
OSHA, 67 GEo. L.J. 729, 767 (1979) (referring to "Professor Davis' almost talismanic
distinction between 'legislative' facts and 'adjudicative' facts"); Robinson, The Making
of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Admin-
istrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 536 (1970) (Legislative fact and
adjudicative fact are "highly elastic concepts [that] tend to obscure the varied needs of
different agencies and the varied demands of different regulatory functions."). More-
over, at least one court has doubted the value of the distinction. See Bowling v. Depart-
ment of Ins., 394 So. 2d 165, 174 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (finding the distinction
between legislative and adjudicative facts to be "abstract and unprofitable," and term-
ing what Davis would call an adjudicative fact, "a plain, garden-variety fact"). Even
some who have adopted the legislative-adjudicative fact distinction "do so without any
affection for that distinction." Miller & Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary
System, and the Flow of Information to the Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L.
REV. 1187, 1234 n.120 (1975).
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C. The Inadequacy of Legislative Facts
We accept Davis's insight that empirical information can play two
distinctly different roles in legal decisionmaking. Yet in distinguishing
"legislative" from "adjudicative" fact, Davis perpetuated the old pre-
Realist boundaries of the distinction between "fact" and "law." He left
the classification of empirical information as fact, and merely divided
the category of fact into two subcategories, one of which (legislative)
reflected the Realist position that judges make law. The procedural
ramifications emanating from Davis's tacit acceptance of the manner in
which classical jurisprudence separated fact and law have been limited
to the largely negative proposal that facts used to create a rule of law
are not to be treated as other facts are treated in court. This view fails
to provide clear direction regarding how courts should obtain social sci-
ence data, and contains no information about how courts should evalu-
ate what they have obtained, or what effect they should give to the
evaluation of other courts.
The general and established rule is that questions of law are an-
swered by the judge and questions of fact are answered by the jury (or
trier of fact). If the interpretation of scientific research is considered a
question of fact, it seems apparent that the research should be intro-
duced as other facts are introduced-by oral testimony (here, the oral
testimony of experts)-for consideration by the jury.26 As Davis recog-
nized, however, presenting facts to a jury is "wholly inappropriate"
2 7
when those facts are used to determine the content of law and policy.
28
He argued that the traditional method of presenting facts via testimony,
either before a jury or a judicial fact-finder, should apply only to adju-
dicative facts. Legislative facts, in contrast, should be presented to the
court in its capacity as lawmaker.29
But how should the parties present legislative facts for the court's
consideration? Here, Davis and the Federal Rules of Evidence, which
incorporate his distinction, are not conclusive. The parties appear to be
free either to present legislative facts via expert witnesses at a hearing
or to include them in briefs, as Brandeis did in Muller. No positive
26 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, an expert witness may testify "[i]f scien-
tific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact . . . ." FED.
R. EVID. 702. "[An expert on the stand may give a dissertation or exposition of scien-
tific or other principles relevant to the case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them to the
facts." Id. advisory committee note.
27 Davis, Facts, supra note 18, at 941.
2 To present such facts to a jury would allow the jury to create law, a task
universally regarded as reserved to the legislature and the judiciary.
29 Davis, Facts, supra note 18, at 940.
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guidance is provided, although the theoretical and practical differences
between the two techniques are great.3"
Davis's unexamined retention of the formalists' division between
law and fact also hampers confident resolution of the difficult question
whether a court should independently search for scientific research
when it appears relevant to the decision but has not been presented by
the parties. Naively applying the adversary system's accepted rule that
all facts must appear in the trial record clearly would preclude a court
from independently searching for relevant scientific research.
As Davis again recognized, applying the traditional evidentiary
rules of fact-gathering to legislative facts would produce "obviously in-
tolerable" results.31 He argued that the restrictions on courts' powers to
take "judicial notice," which preclude courts from making independent
investigations of the facts at issue in a case, apply only to adjudicative
facts. 2
What, then, of legislative facts? The Federal Rules of Evidence do
not address independent judicial investigation, just as they do not ad-
dress how the parties should present legislative fact information. An
Advisory Committee Note, however, reflects Davis's view that courts
should be free to initiate an independent search for legislative facts and
to take judicial notice of whatever they find. 3 This is presented as only
one option, however. The Advisory Committee also would allow appel-
late courts to decline to do independent research, and instead remand
cases to the trial court "for the taking of evidence" regarding legislative
facts.34
30 The advisory committee note on Federal Rule of Evidence 201(a) states that,
"no rule deals with judicial notice of legislative" facts. The note then continues with
considerable description of the distinction, emphasizing the importance of legislative
facts.
31 Davis, A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience, in
PERSPECTIvEs OF LAW 68, 83 (R. Pound, E. Griswold & A. Sutherland eds. 1964). A
judge would have to feign ignorance of relevant research that he or she knew existed
and could affect a ruling of law in a case, whenever the parties' briefs failed to intro-
duce the research. The judge would then be forced knowingly to create an inadequate
and perhaps erroneous rule of law that could affect future cases, simply because the
parties in the case at bar failed to find research of which the judge was already aware.
32 See Davis, Facts, supra note 18, at 940-41; see also FED. R. EVID. 201 ("gov-
ern[ing] only judicial notice of adjudicative fact"). Professors, Saltzburg and Redden
note that "[t]he most serious problem with Rule 201 may be its total failure to address
legislative facts." S. SALrZBURG & K. RkEDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MAN-
UAL 43 (3d ed. 1982).
3 See FED. R. EvID. 201(a) advisory committee note. Davis believes, however,
that in some circumstances the parties should be notified of the court's intention to rely
upon research found through independent investigation. See Davis, Facts, supra note
18, at 935.
34 FED. R. EVID. 201(a) advisory committee note.
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In addition to the Advisbry Committee's indeterminate procedures
for gathering legislative facts, the jurisprudential underpinning of Da-
vis's position on independent judicial investigation of legislative facts is
surprisingly weak. According to Davis, "The reason we allow judicial
notice to be taken of extra-record [legislative] facts is . . .to promote
convenience. Tribunals make factual assumptions because it is conven-
ient to do so. Indeed, to fail to make factual assumptions would mean
extreme inconvenience. ' '* 5
If the distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts leaves
courts perplexed as to how they should obtain social science research,
the distinction provides no direction at all concerning either how courts
should evaluate the information they do obtain or how they should treat
prior judicial consideration of that material. Yet one cannot confidently
answer questions about how courts should obtain social science data
without a clear view of how they will test the materials that they find.
If judges independently may obtain social science studies, they must
have an acceptable plan for evaluating these materials since the parties
may not be involved in the evaluation. And if a major block of judicial
time and energy is assigned to the evaluation of either party-generated
or independently obtained research, a process should be developed to
insure that essentially the same evaluation is not repeated in every
case." The Davis distinction-with its tacit reliance upon a pre-Realist
35 Davis, supra note 31, at 93. Given that the prevailing view of social science
research as legislative fact suggests no preferred route for courts to obtain this type of
"fact" from the parties, and that the justification this view offers for a court's indepen-
dent investigation is no more principled than "it is convenient to do so," the current
judicial disarray on this topic is understandable. Some judges now routinely undertake
their own search for relevant empirical data, while others obtain data only from trial
court records or briefs. See T. MARVELL, APPELLATE COURTS AND LAWYERS 192
(1978) (reporting that 40% of the citations to empirical research appearing in the opin-
ions of one state's supreme court had been obtained through the justices's independent
investigations, and 60% of the social facts supported by empirical data (in the opinions)
came from the record or the briefs, including amicus briefs). Apparently, remanding a
case to the trial court to take expert testimony on empirical questions also remains an
option. See, e.g., Borden's Farm Prods. Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194 (1934). Reported
instances of this technique are rare, although it has been discussed by commentators.
See M. SAKs & R. VAN DUIZEND, THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN LITIGATION
81 (1983).
36 See Merryman, The Authority of Authority: What the California Supreme
Court Cited in 1950, 6 STAN. L. REV. 613 (1954). Merryman argues that there is an
advantage to the judicial process
in not requiring the judge to go over old ground in all cases. There are
many situations where it would be useless and wasteful to require the
judge to reconsider the problem from its origins. Much is saved in letting
him dispose of the problem on the basis of conclusions reached in earlier
decisions.
Id. at 624 (footnote omitted).
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conceptualization of the difference between fact and law-provides no
assistance in meeting these interrelated demands.
II. SOCIAL SCIENCE AS AUTHORITY
It is difficult to gainsay the recent conclusion that "a viable formu-
lation of rules . . . with regard to legislative facts has not proven feasi-
ble.".37 Attempts at further refinement of legislative fact into ever nar-
rower subcategories do not appear promising. 8 Rather, improvement
in the use of social science information in the courts may be possible
only "within the perimeters of a new concept,"39 a concept that would
fundamentally alter the way in which courts view social science
materials.
We propose social authority as such a concept. We argue that
courts should treat social science research relevant to creating a rule of
law as a source of authority rather than as a source of facts.40 More
specifically we propose that courts treat social science research as they
would legal precedent under the common law.41
Our argument for turning on its head the accepted way of viewing
social science research is not deontological. We make no claim that ju-
risprudential principles compel our conclusion. Rather, we proceed on
a more modest course. We argue first that while there is an obvious
conceptual similarity between social science research and fact, there is
an equally clear conceptual bond between social science research and
law. We then contend that, given the similarities we have identified, it
is jurisprudentially plausible to classify social science research either as
37 MCCORMICK ON EvIDENCE, supra note 20, at 937.
38 See Davis, Facts, supra note 18, at 932 (discussing six scales for distinguishing
types of facts and exploring the practical problems of such distinctions).
3" MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 20, at 938.
40 There may be uses of social scientific research in addition to formulating a rule
of law to which the "social authority" concept would apply. In a future article, we plan
to demonstrate that scientific research used to create an empirical "frame of reference"
(within which facts specific to a case can be determined) may also be considered in part
as social authority. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 96 N.J. 611, 477 A.2d 308 (1984) (permit-
ting the defendant in a capital case, through use of an expert witness, to introduce into
evidence testimony relating to empirical studies relevant to the defendant's potential for
violent behavior). The social authority concept, however, is not applicable where social
science is used only as evidence in a specific case. In that instance, the fact classification
is, in our view, entirely appropriate. Typical examples of such cases are disputes over
various aspects of trademark rights and claims of discrimination under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act. Social science research is routinely employed in such cases, but almost
always to determine facts specific to the case (whether, for example, consumers are
confused by similar trademarks and whether employment practices result in disparate
racial impact).
41 See infra text accompanying notes 58-130 for a detailed account of the method-
ological implications of this proposal.
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fact or as law. Finally, we propose that the question how to classify
social science research be decided in terms of which classification is
most useful for the legal process.
Our initial case for the jurisprudential plausibility of viewing so-
cial science as a form of authority takes this observation as its point of
departure: while empirical research has some of the characteristics of
fact, it has some of the characteristics of law as well. Until now, courts
and commentators have attended to the similarity between social science
and fact, and have largely ignored the similarity between social science
and law."2
A. Similarity Between Social Science and Fact
The principal similarity between social science research and fact is
that both are positive-both concern the way the world is, with no nec-
essary implications for the way the world ought to be. Both refer to the
empirical reality that we infer from our senses, rather than to the value
we impute to that reality. Law, in contrast, is normative. It does not
describe how people do behave, but rather prescribes how they should
behave.43
42 Korn, Law, Fact, and Science in the Courts, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1080, 1081
(1966) (presenting a "speculative and exploratory analysis" regarding the question
"Why indeed is decision based on scientific knowledge so generally treated as 'fact'
determination?"). Korn posited that
law-whether statutory or judge-made-and the sciences both involve
bodies of generalized, systematized, and transmissible knowledge ....
This view would suggest that scientific learning entering the legal order
should have a natural affinity for the generalized, systematized, and trans-
missible aspect of that order-the body of statutory and judge-made
'law'-rather than for the process of case by case 'fact determination.!
Id. at 1101. Korn concludes, however, that such a view fails to take into account that
law is normative while social science is positive, id., a distinction we recognize but do
not view as dispositive. See infra text accompanying notes 44-48.
42 As Korn has noted:
[P]erhaps the most fundamental source of difficulty in technical fact deter-
mination is that the law and the scientific knowledge to which it refers
often serve different purposes. Concerned with ordering men's conduct in
accordance with certain standards, values, and societal goals, the legal sys-
tem is a prescriptive and normative one dealing with the 'ought to be.'
Much scientific knowledge, on the other hand, is purely descriptive; its
'laws' seek not to control or judge the phenomena of the real world, but to
describe or explain them in neutral terms.
Korn, supra note 42, at 1093-94. Similarly, Kelsen claimed that
[a] law of nature is a statement to the effect that if there is A, there is B,
whereas a rule of morality or a rule of law is a statement to the effect that
if there is A, there ought to be B. It is the difference between the "is" and
the "ought," the difference between causality and normativity. ...
H. KELSEN, The Natural-Law Doctrine Before the Tribunal of Science, in WHAT is
490 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
In Part I we sought to explain how formal jurisprudence initially
classified social science research as a source of facts. Since it is clear
that research findings change as the empirical events they reflect
change, a jurisprudence that denies. change in law could not accommo-
date any positive elements within the meaning of the term "law." To
do otherwise would imply that principles of law were bound by time or
place, notions that were anathema to the formalists.
This concept of immutable law was one of the first casualties of
the Realist revolution. In the Realist view, all law was constantly "in
flux." The variability of social science findings over time and place,
therefore, did not compel its relegation to the domain of fact. Change
itself no longer distinguished the legal from the factual; both could, and
did, change. This view of law thus loosened the bond linking social
science research and fact.
B. Similarity Between Social Science and Law
The principal similarity between social science research and law is
that both are general-both produce principles applicable beyond par-
ticular instances. Facts, in contrast, are specific to particular in-
stances.44 Social science research, though derived from specific empiri-
cal data, typically addresses persons, situations, and time periods
beyond those present in a particular investigation. Indeed, the purpose
of most scientific research is to obtain knowledge that, while surely not
immutable, holds true for many people over considerable time and in a
variety of places.4" Because of this generality, the conclusions of empiri-
cal research are sometimes metaphorically described as scientific laws."6
Like social science, law, particularly court decisions in a common-
law system, derives from specific empirical events (the facts of a case),
JUSTICE? JUSTICE, LAW, AND POLITICS IN THE MIRROR OF SCIENCE 137, 139
(1957); see also Morris, supra note 8, at 1329 ("The distinction between propositions
of fact and conclusions of law is this: Propositions of fact are descriptive; conclusions of
law are dispositive."); cf. THE Is/OUGHT QUESTION (W. Hudson ed. 1969) (a collec-
tion of essays by philosophers on the is-ought distinction in moral philosophy); P.
FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES 79 (1978) ("Many modern moral philosophers have taken
up Hume's argument and, starting from his premise about the necessarily practical
nature of morality, assert his conclusion about the gap between is and ought.").
44 Cf K. DAVIS, supra note 18, at 149 (Adjudicative facts are "facts concerning
the immediate parties.").
41 Indeed, these are the three components of "external validity." See infra text
accompanying notes 70-79 & 100-12.
-46 See, e.g., I. HOROWITZ & T. WILLGING, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LAW 41
(1984) ("Science has come to mean specific ways of gathering and systematizing knowl-




but speaks more broadly. It is this attribute of generality that is de-
scribed as the "precedential effect" or authoritative nature of a court
decision. A decision takes on the mantle of legal authority in subse-
quent litigation precisely to the extent that the decision transcends the
people, situation, and time present in the original case. Indeed, the way
to deny legal authority to a court decision is to deny its generality by
claiming that the decision is limited to its Own facts.
An important aspect of the generality that social science and law
share is that they both typically address future, as-yet-unknown contin-
gencies. Scientific findings are evaluated in part by their heuristic
value-by their ability to order and make understandable new phenom-
ena. Likewise, a court decision comes to be accorded the status of prece-
dent when it is found to embody a principle that assists in the resolu-
tion of a subsequent conflict.47 In both cases, the risk of strategic bias is
reduced, since investigators or judges could not have anticipated all the
applications that would be found for their work in the future. The gen-
eral applicability of both common-law precedent and much of social
science research is augmented by the fact that, at the time the research
is conducted or the decision is rendered, the ultimate implications can
be only dimly foreseen, if foreseen at all.
Contrast, in this regard, the two very different uses of social sci-
ence research in court. Research used in the creation of a rule of
law-for example, studies on the effects of school segregation on self-
esteem, the effects of exposure to pornography on anti-social behavior,
or the deterrent value of the death penalty-has the same kind of fu-
ture-oriented generality that case precedent possesses. The studies ap-
ply to the specific disputes in which they are introduced, but they apply
to many other disputes as well. The particulars of the litigation relate
to the research only as exemplars of the larger phenomenon investi-
gated. However, when social science research is not used to create a
rule of law, but rather to adjudicate an issue within a settled legal con-
text, it has no generality. Research used in this case-specific man-
ner-for example, surveys of the prevalence of consumer confusion be-
tween contested trademarks-is much closer to what has traditionally
been considered facts than it is to law. The resolution of the issue on
which the research bears has no substantive implications beyond the
specific case in which it is introduced."'
47 See generally R. CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW (1961) (examining the
strongly coercive nature of the English doctrine of precedent).
48 See supra note 40.
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C. The Question of Command
If social science research is like fact in one way (both are positive),
and like law in another (both are general), there seems to be no juris-
prudential reason why it could not as plausibly be grouped with the
latter as with the former, at least for some legal purposes. One argu-
ment against pursuing the analogy between social science research and
law is that since researchers are not elected or appointed to public of-
fice, social science research lacks the official sanction characteristic of
legal authority. This objection is based on J.L. Austin's view that all
law emanates from a command issued by the sovereign. 9 Austin took
the position that anything that did not ultimately derive from an order
of some sovereign power was not properly considered law. Austin's per-
spective would preclude empirical research from being treated as law,
since the findings of social science do not derive from the command of
any sovereign.
The modern criticism of Austinian jurisprudence, however, has
been trenchant. H.L.A. Hart identified the fact that it operates on the
model of the "gunman writ large" as the central problem with Austin's
position. 50 That is, laws derive their authority in precisely the way that
a gunman robbing a stranger derives "authority": by issuing commands
and backing them with the threat of sanction. According to Hart, the
principal difficulty inherent in this conception of lawmaking is that it
distorts the content of much that is commonly considered law. Many
laws simply do not fit the model of coercive orders or commands. For
example, facilitative laws are inexplicable under an Austinian view. A
law can facilitate the making of wills by describing how a will is prop-
erly made. Or a law can facilitate the formation of contracts by specify-
ing the conditions under which a contract is validly formed. In neither
case is it obvious how the law "commands" anything. Since the element
of command is lacking in many instances of what are generally con-
'1 See J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 1-25 (2d ed.
London 1861) (1st ed. London 1832).
80 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 18-25 (1961). There are many criti-
cisms of Austin similar to Hart's. See, e.g., L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 46-
49, 97, 191-97, 225-26 (rev. ed. 1969) (arguing that the positivistic approach toward
reality is most difficult to maintain when dealing with human interaction); J. GRAY,
THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 73-81 (1927) (contending that true sover-
eignty cannot truly be discovered and that, besides, there is nothing jurisprudentially to
be gained by use of the concept); H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE
30-37, 71-74, 127-28 (A. Wedberg trans. 1961) (arguing that the contradictions in
Austin's theories are a result of his characterization of law as a command); H. SIDG-
WICK, THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICS app. A (4th ed. 1919) (criticizing Austin's ap-
proach for failing both to be in accordance with history and to account for power being
vested in more than one body).
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ceded to be laws, 51 the absence of command in social science research
does not appear to be an insuperable bar to its incorporation into the
concept of law.
Not only does a lack of official command not preclude social sci-
ence research from being treated as courts treat legal precedent, but
positive materials similar to social science and equally lacking in com-
mand have routinely been incorporated into the common law of Eng-
land and the United States for centuries. As John Merryman has
stated, "It is possible for cases to be decided, rules of law to be stated,
lines of decision begun and perpetuated, solely on the authority of a
textual treatment having its origins outside the judicial or legislative
process.
''52
Custom is one of the earliest and clearest examples of positive
materials being treated as law. Blackstone recognized that general cus-
toms, doctrines that are not set down in any written statute or ordi-
nance, but depend merely upon immemorial usage,53 frequently attain
the status of law. He cited numerous rules of inheritance, property
transfer, contracts, and wills as examples of the incorporation of posi-
tive materials into legal rules."'
" It is, of course, possible to challenge Austin's views without proposing a view of
law devoid of all coercive elements. See Feeley, The Concept of Laws in Social Science:
A Critique and Notes on an Expanded View, 10 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 497, 508-09
(1976) (noting that purely definitional laws have no sanctions attached to them, but
may have sanctions associated with them as they connect with other laws and
practices).
52 Merryman, supra note 36, at 620. Professor Merryman continued:
It can be argued that statutes and cases are law, while secondary
authorities [such as social science studies] are not. This distinction sounds
good, but it actually begs the question. Whether secondary authorities are
or are not law depends on what the courts do with them. If the courts cite
them then they are in some sense law as a result of the citation; they
become a part of the judicial process ...
The conclusion is that. . . authority varies in degree but not in kind,
and statutes and cases are more authoritative than other legal and nonlegal
writing, but are no more authority.
Id. at 621.
1' W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *64.
Id. at *68; see also C. ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 119 (1948) (citing exam-
ples of customs recognized in the law, including wardship and marriage, freedom and
equality of justice, and trial by jury).
Custom has always played an important role in the settlement of commercial dis-
putes. As early as 1250 in England, as part of the royal franchise to hold a trade fair,
local authorities were allowed to hold courts to settle business disputes that arose dur-
ing the course of the fair. These "pie powder" courts, a name derived from the "pieds
poudres" or dirty feet of itinerant merchants who frequented the fairs, employed rules
of decision derived from the business customs of the day. These rules were later collec-
tively labeled the "law merchant." See Bane, From Holt and Mansfield to Story to
Llewellyn and Mentschikoffi The Progressive Development of Commercial Law, 37 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 351 (1983). Modern commercial law has likewise been profoundly
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D. The Criterion for Classification
We have argued that social science has some of the attributes of
law, that no conceptual barriers exist to its being considered as law,
and that precedent exists for treating similar positive materials as law.
It follows that it is jurisprudentially plausible for courts to treat social
science research as they treat prior judicial decisions under the common
law. We also have freely conceded that social science research has some
of the attributes of fact. In light of the history from Muller to the pre-
sent, there is obviously no conceptual barrier to considering social sci-
ence research as fact, and much precedent for so doing.
If we have made our threshold case that it is jurisprudentially pos-
sible for social science research to be classified as either law or fact, the
next question concerns the nature of the argument that is to decide
which classification should be used. Of two plausible classification
schemes, how does one choose between them? How, in other words,
does one decide which similarities-the similarities to law or the simi-
larities to fact-are the most important? The question is taxonomic,
and the extensive literature in the field of classification yields a clear
answer: the better classification is the one that is most useful. "The real
question," according to Julian Simon, "is not whether or not the items
you lump together are different in some ways, but whether or not they
are similar for your purposes."5 Similarly, Carl McDaniel believes
that classification schemes "must lend themselves to the purpose of the
scholar in relation to the problem he is attacking. He must look for and
identify the particular kinds of shared characteristics that are signifi-
cant for his purposes, and must devise categories accordingly. 56
influenced by custom. See Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the U.C.C., 27
STAN. L. REV. 621, 623 (1975) ("[T]he legislative process associated with the Uniform
Commercial Code was more like law-stating than law-making."); see also Goetz &
Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Ex-
press and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAUF. L. REv. 261 (1985) (examining the
relationship between state-supplied contractual formulations and private contract
terms).
Custom is perhaps most explicitly incorporated into international law. Article 38-
1(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides that the Court "shall
apply . . . international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law."
The United States Supreme Court acknowledged custom as an authoritative source of
international law as early as 1899. See The Pacquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700
(1899) (finding that in the absence of a treaty, executive and legislative acts, and judi-
cial decisions, the courts should resort to "customs and usages of civilized nations" in
order to determine what the law is).
55 J. SIMON, BASIC RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL SCIENCES 294 (1969).
56 C. MCDANIEL, RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 23 (1974); see also A. KAPLAN,
THE CONDUCT OF INQUIRY 51 (1964) ("The purpose of scientific classification is to
facilitate the fulfillment of any purpose whatever . . ").
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The accepted view, therefore, is that classification is always provi-
sional, depending entirely on how well the classification scheme suits
particular purposes. 57 The adequacy of our proposal-that social sci-
ence research be treated by the courts as courts treat legal precedent
rather than as fact-depends, therefore, upon the quality of the judicial
management procedures that flow from this social authority classifica-
tion, as compared with the existing procedures that result from the fact
classification. Like all classification decisions, this is largely an empiri-
cal question. The question in this case must be measured against the
fairness and efficiency of the rules of law that result from the classifica-
tion. We turn in Part III to a presentation of specific suggestions that
are implicit in our proposal, and argue that they are sufficiently prom-
ising to warrant their being tested by the courts.
III. OBTAINING, EVALUATING, AND
ESTABLISHING SOCIAL AUTHORITY
What implications flow from conceiving of social science as more
akin to law than to fact? We offer a series of proposals addressed to the
three questions that have proved most vexing to American courts when
empirical studies appear relevant to rendering a decision: (1) how
should courts obtain information from the social sciences?; (2) how
should they evaluate it?; and (3) how should they treat the empirical
conclusions established by other courts?
The heuristic presumption with which we approach each question
is that courts should treat social science data the same way they treat
legal precedent. The differences are striking between our proposals,
which derive from a conception of social authority, and the existing
melange of suggestions that regard empirical research as legislative
facts. We believe that the strength of our theoretical position rests on
the simplicity and coherence it brings to the tasks of obtaining, evaluat-
ing, and establishing social science in the courts.
A. Obtaining Social Authority
From a theory that posits social science as a source of authority in
the law flow two corollary propositions regarding how a court should
obtain empirical research: the parties should present empirical research
to the court in briefs rather than by testimony; and the court may locate
social science studies through its own research."8
'7 See E. MAYR, PRINCIPLES OF SYSTEMATIC ZOOLOGY 80 (1969).
18 See Brennan, Working at Justice, in AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE SUPREME
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1. Written Briefs from the Parties
We noted in Part I that the concept of legislative fact, as reflected
in the Federal Rules of Evidence,5 9 does not inform the parties how to
present empirical research to the court. The parties appear to be free
either to present legislative facts via expert witnesses at a hearing or to
include them in briefs, as Brandeis did in Muller. °
Conceiving of scientific research not as legislative fact but as social
authority resolves this indecision. If the research is more analogous to
law than to fact, the parties should present the research to the court in
the same manner that they would offer legal precedents, that is, in
written briefs rather than by oral testimony. Parties wishing to argue
that a prior legal decision should be taken as precedent for the present
case do not do so by introducing as a witness the judge who wrote the
prior opinion. Similarly, the oral testimony of the authors of social sci-
ence research should not be the vehicle by which the research is intro-
duced in court.
What would happen if courts foreclosed the option of party-initi-
ated expert testimony and made Brandeis briefs the sole means of
presenting social science research pertinent to a question of law? While
this is an empirical question for which definitive data are not available,
there are reasons to believe that written briefs are a superior medium to
verbal testimony for communicating technical social science
information.
Harold Korn, for example, questions "whether oral communica-
tion is at all conducive to correct determination of complicated scientific
and technological issues . . . . A written report may be a much more
effective way of explaining scientific detail and complexity." 1 This
may be due to several factors. The source of the communication-the
social science researcher-has less time to frame a precise answer and
less opportunity to refer to the primary data when responding verbally
than when writing a book or an article. In hearing expert testimony,
the judge faces a question-and-answer format that Thomas Marvell be-
lieves is "longer, less well organized and more difficult to follow than
COURT: OFF-THE-BENCH COMMENTARY BY THE JusTicEs 300, 303 (A. Weston ed.
1963). Justice Brennan uses the phrase "independent research" to refer to the judicial
search for extra-record material such as social science research. This is preferable to the
phrase "judicial notice," which is more relevant in the context of a judge recognizing a
case-specific ("adjudicative") fact not in the record. See FED. R. EVID. 201.
5 See FED. R. EvID. 201; id. 201(a) advisory committee note.
60 208 U.S. at 419 n.1 (1908).
61 Korn, supra note 42, at 1086.
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written materials such as Brandeis briefs."'8 2 While some information,
notably the demeanor of the witness, is lost in written communication,
such evidence is more likely to distract the court than contribute to its
understanding. The sweating, shifty-eyed witness to a criminal's alibi
may indeed be less credible than is the calm and self-assured witness;
but observable nervousness on the part of an expert presenting social
science data is more likely to reflect unfamiliarity with courtroom pro-
cedures than it is to indicate that the underlying data are invalid.
Apart from their superiority as a method of communicating social
science data, written briefs provide at least two additional benefits.63
First, it may cost less to prepare a brief than it does to present an
expert witness. Indigent parties, therefore, may find the written brief
their only option in presenting social science information. Second, since
the appeal process often takes years, the testimony of an expert witness
may be out-of-date by the time the court of last review decides the case.
It is much more expeditious for the parties to submit updated briefs
than it is to remand a case for additional expert testimony regarding
research that has come to light since the case originally was decided.
2. Independent Judicial Investigation
We have noted that the legislative fact view offers only "con-
venience" as a possible justification for courts investigating indepen-
dently to obtain empirical studies. Treating empirical research as a
source of authority rather than as a type of fact can provide the princi-
pled direction now lacking on the issue of whether judges should locate
research independently. The analogy is plain: as courts are free to find
legal precedents that the parties have not presented," they should also
have the power to locate social science research through independent
investigation. Courts are not limited to the case precedents contained in
the parties' briefs and are not required to remand for further hearings
to develop a record in which case precedents can be introduced. Like-
wise, they should not be limited to the briefs or required to remand to
obtain scientific research.
If the social authority concept provides the principle by which
judges' independent investigations can be justified, are there any coun-
tervailing reasons for precluding judicial investigation? Surely the most
62 See T. MARVELL, supra note 35, at 195.
6 See id.
64 See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 850
(2d ed. 1982) ("In deciding questions of law, the judge is not confined to sources sup-
plied by the parties.").
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serious objection is that judges cannot properly evaluate the research
they may find, and that they may therefore base rules of law either
upon invalid research studies or upon a misunderstanding of valid re-
search."5 The heuristic value of the social authority concept is, however,
greatest at precisely this juncture. Thus, we now turn our attention to
the issue of judicial evaluation of social science research.
B. Evaluating Social Authority
The question of what courts should do with empirical information
after it has been obtained-by whatever means-has received remarka-
bly little attention. Kenneth Culp Davis addressed only the issue of
courts gathering research at their own initiative.6 Even here, his pro-
posal is entirely formal: in at least some circumstances, the court should
notify the parties that empirical research is in hand and allow them an
opportunity to "challenge" the data.
7
But on what grounds is the research to be challenged? And how
may it be shown to have withstood the challenge? On these crucial sub-
stantive questions the concept of legislative fact suggests no course of
action.6 8 If one discards the legislative fact blinders, however, and be-
gins to conceive of research as a form of authority in the law, the gen-
eral direction courts should take in evaluating empirical data can be
discerned from the way they evaluate case precedents.
Courts assign precedential value to prior judicial decisions by a
process that is neither clear nor simple. One need not unpack the whole
jurisprudence of precedent, however, to arrive at an appreciation of the
factors on which courts rely in evaluating prior cases. At least four
indices of precedential persuasiveness can be easily abstracted from the
jurisprudential literature: (1) cases decided by courts higher in the ap-
pellate structure have more weight than lower court decisions; (2) bet-
ter reasoned cases have more weight than poorly reasoned cases; (3)
cases involving facts closely analogous to those in the case at issue have
more weight than cases involving easily distinguished facts; and (4)
cases followed by other courts have more weight than isolated cases.
We realize that these indicia of precedential value cannot be ap-
plied literally to the evaluation of social science research. Scientific
studies themselves, for example, are not "decided" by or "appealed" to
varying levels of the judiciary. Yet, as we hope to demonstrate, the
65 See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 113-20.
66 See Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence, supra note 18, at 365-66.
67 See id. at 392-93.
68 See supra text accompanying notes 26-36.
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principles courts use to distinguish cases in terms of their precedential
worth bear a striking similarity to the principles used by social scien-
tists to distinguish research studies in terms of their scientific worth.69
We propose, therefore, that courts evaluate scientific research studies
along four dimensions analogous to the four dimensions used to evalu-
ate case precedent. Courts should place confidence in a piece of scien-
tific research to the extent that the research (1) has survived the critical
review of the scientific community; (2) has employed valid research
methods; (3) is generalizable to the case at issue; and (4) is supported
by a body of other research.
1. Critical Review
It is generally accepted that the higher the level of the court that
issues a decision, the more authoritative the decision will be.70 The es-
sential justification for attributing more precedential weight to appel-
late than to trial court decisions is that trial court judgments have not
been reviewed. That is, other judges have not subjected the decision of
the trial judge to examination and re-analysis.
There are several reasons why appellate review has such impor-
tance as an index of precedential worth. The independent or disinter-
ested nature of the review helps insure that technical mistakes have not
been made.71 Appellate judges have the benefit of the trial judge's anal-
ysis of the law but are not bound by that analysis. The collegiality of
appellate decisionmaking, which relies on groups of judges rather than
on a single trial judge, reduces the risk of idiosyncratic interpretations
" The similarity we note between law and social science would not surprise phi-
losopher of science Michael Scriven. Scriven claims that
it is true that extremely wide-ranging subjects, concerned with human be-
havior, in which a systemic rational approach is employed, aimed in part
at yielding socially useful results, exhibit a great similarity of methods.
, * * A good analysis of legal reasoning often shows us, in my view, some
very important features of all reasoning-not just some special features of
the methodology of law.
Scriven, Methods of Reasoning and Justification in Social Science and Law, 23 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 189, 192-93 (1970). But see Haney, Psychology and Legal Change: On
the Limits of a Factual Jurisprudence, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 147, 158 (1980) (as-
serting that "[s]ubstantial differences exist between the styles and methods of reasoning,
proof, and justification used in psychology and law").
70 See, e.g., E. WAMBAUGH, THE STUDY OF CASES 62 (1894) ("A decision of a
court not of last resort is usually not of high persuasive authority.").
7' For example, Henry Black stated that "[lower court] determinations are not
binding upon the appellate court, because the same case, or similar case might be
brought before it, and it would then of course be at liberty and under an obligation to
consider the questions involved unhampered by any but its own previous decisions." H.
BLACK, LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS 118-19 (1912).
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of the law.7 2 Moreover, the perspective of appellate courts, which hear
appeals from many trial jurisdictions, are conducive to developing more
broadly-based and less fact-specific legal principles.
7 3
The importance of independent review by colleagues of broad per-
spective to the process of evaluating precedents finds a strong parallel
in social scientists' evaluation of the merits of prior research studies.
The first question asked by those who assess a research report typically
concerns the thoroughness of the review process to which the report has
been subjected. Findings generated by unpublished research, for exam-
ple, are highly suspect, because no one in the scientific community has
had the opportunity to evaluate the research methods or the inferences
drawn from them. Research published in what are referred to as "non-
refereed" journals, or by "vanity press" book publishers, are viewed
with similar caution. In these cases as well, there has been no indepen-
dent examination of the research by disinterested scientific colleagues
who may have a broader perspective on the topic than does the
researcher. 4
The publication of research in refereed journals, or in books that
have professional editorial boards, is an important indication of the
weight that social scientists will accord a finding. Upon seeing a report
in a refereed journal, for example, a social scientist, without reading
the study, will at least know that several disinterested social scientists,
chosen largely for their own scientific accomplishments, have reviewed
the research and have found it worthy of publication. Such a review
process goes far in screening out empirical assertions unsupported by
the data.7 5
Social science research faces critical evaluation in several other
contexts as well. Federal funding agencies generally rely on an expert
review panel to evaluate the methodological adequacy of research pro-
posals. Research funded by such agencies, therefore, has often survived
72 See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 31
(1960).
" See C. CURTIS, IT'S YOUR LAW 127 (1954) ("[T]he fact that the courts of
appeal work at a farther remove from the actual and the concrete, and therefore have to
express their opinions in general terms, make their judgments inevitably applicable to
similar future cases.").
74 For example, the Procedures for Renewal and Promotion in the Faculty of
Arts and Sciences of the University of Virginia (1983) specify that "articles in refereed
journals" are to be distinguished from "popular articles and other publications" in the
decision whether to grant tenure to a faculty member.
75 It is not unusual for editorial reviewers to reject 80 to 90% of all submissions to
"prestigious" social science journals. See Summary Report of Journal Operations:
1984, 40 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 707 (1985). In contrast to law reviews, no social science
journals place the manuscript selection process in the hands of student editors.
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intense and highly competitive screenings. 6 After publication, the pro-
cess of collegial review may continue. Research published in book form
is the frequent object of critical reviews in journals.77 Literature re-
views, which summarize and analyze all of the findings on a given
topic, are published periodically. 8 Perhaps the most authoritative form
of post-publication review of scientific findings occurs when organiza-
tions such as the National Academy of Sciences or the National Insti-
tute of Mental Health appoint panels of the most distinguished scien-
tists in the field, provide them with ample time and resources, and
commission a state-of-the-art evaluation of a given area of research.7"
Courts could thus evaluate a piece of social science research initially by
assessing the degree to which it has been subjected to, and has survived,
critical review by other researchers in the area.
2. Valid Research Methods
The extent to which courts will accord a decision precedential
value depends not only upon the level of court that issued it, but also
upon the quality of reasoning revealed in the opinion itself. Decisions
viewed as "well reasoned" are more likely to be taken as authoritative
in future cases than are decisions in which the inferential links between
the principles invoked and the holding reached are difficult to discern
or are logically flawed. At one extreme, decisions that simply state the
court's conclusions, without providing any supportive reasoning, are
71 See, e.g., Information for the National Institutes of Health Research Grant
Applicants 3 (Sept. 1976) (The "study section" that reviews grants in a given area of
social science consists of 10 to 20 of the "best qualified, available, principally non-
Governmental research investigators in the program areas." Those in charge of the
study sections "strive to make certain that all points of view and theoretical interests
within a given program area are represented in a balanced manner."); The National
Science Foundation Program Announcement 9 (Dec. 31, 1985) ("All proposals are re-
viewed carefully by a scientist . . . serving as an NSF program officer and usually by
3 to 10 other individuals who are expert in the particular field represented by the
proposal. Some program officers obtain further comment from assembled advisory com-
mittees before recommending final action on proposals.").
7 For example, journals such as Contemporary Psychiatry and Contemporary
Psychology publish reviews only of recent books.
78 The Annual Review series, which includes the Annual Review of Anthropol-
ogy, the Annual Review of Psychology, and the Annual Review of Sociology, among
others, is the most well known book series of this type.
71 Paul Giannelli has suggested that the National Academy of Sciences in fact has
functioned like a "Science Court" in reviewing the validity of some scientific tech-
niques. See Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLuM. L. REv. 1197, 1232 (1980); see also DETER-
RENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
ON CRIME RATES (A. Blumstein, J. Cohen & D. Nagin eds. 1978) (assessing the scien-
tific validity of extensive research on the deterrent effects of criminal sanctions).
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unlikely to persuade future decisionmakers8 0 At the other extreme, de-
cisions that clearly detail a logical reasoning process may be found com-
pelling when applied to similar fact situations in the future."1
While one can point to illustrations of particularly well-reasoned
and particularly poorly-reasoned decisions, consensus does not exist on
the objective indicia of the quality of judicial reasoning. Fortunately,
for our purposes, there is more agreement among social scientists about
the essential characteristics of scientific reasoning. There is consensus
among social scientists of all disciplines that research must possess "va-
lidity." That is, the methods used in research must be able to justify the
conclusions drawn by the investigator. Validity "is the basic minimum
without which any experiment is uninterpretable."' 2 Validity refers to
the trustworthiness of a piece of research on its own terms, not to
whether the findings apply more broadly to other situations of inter-
est. 8 To have "high" validity, a study must rule out, or "control for,"
competing hypotheses that may account for an observed state of affairs.
A number of factors have been identified that may compromise or
threaten the validity of a research study.8 4 Perhaps the most common
threat to the validity of a study is selection bias. 5 For example, a re-
search project that assessed the effects of a new pre-trial conference
procedure by comparing the settlement rate in ten courts that volun-
81 See Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 11 (1966) ("[A]n
opinion which does not within its own confines exhibit an awareness of relevant consid-
erations, whose premises are concealed, or whose logic is faulty is not likely to enjoy
either a long life or the capacity to generate offspring.").
sI As Llewellyn explained:
For all over the American judicial universe the best cases have been and
are the cases that give a singing reason for either following or extending
or limiting the precedent. . . .The cases which make reputations, the
cases which make light, the cases which are fragrant and lovely, and of
which their authors are rightly proud, are the cases which contain a sing-
ing reason.
Llewellyn, The Status of the Rule ofJudicial Precedent, 14 U. GIN. L. REv. 203, 217
(1940); see also R. LAUN, STARE DECISIS 13 (2d ed. 1947) (stating that "precedents
derive their authority . . .[from] the autonomous subjective experience of the majority
of those who, if the abstract rule . is applied to other concrete facts are required to
obey").
sa D. CAMPBELL & J. STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL
DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH 5 (1963); see also T. COOK & D. CAMPBELL, QUASI-EXPER-
IMENTATION: DESIGN AND ANALYSIS ISSUES FOR FIELD SETTINGS 37 (1979) ("We
shall use the concepts validity and invalidity to refer to the best available approxima-
tion to the truth or falsity of propositions, including propositions about cause.").
8 See infra text accompanying notes 100-10.
8 For an examination of these factors, see D. CAMPBELL & J. STANLEY, supra
note 82, at 5-6, 13-22; T. COOK & D. CAMPBELL, supra note 82.
"' Each of the legal illustrations presented in this and the following section is
taken from another source. See J. MONAHAN & L. WALKER, supra note 4, at 33-81.
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teered for the new procedure with the settlement rate in ten courts that
did not volunteer could be criticized for selection bias. Any differences
between the two groups could be due to pre-existing differences be-
tween them-higher motivation on the part of the volunteers per-
haps-rather than to the new procedure.
Another threat to the validity of a research study is "history." His-
tory, in the sense used here, refers to events occurring during a research
project that may confound the research findings. For example, a study
of the effects of court-ordered busing that found that the proportion of
white students in the affected school district decreased in the five-year
period following the court order would have to contend with history
before concluding that the court order caused the "white flight."86 One
would want to ascertain what else took place in the five-year period.
Was there an increase in property taxes, or a long-term trend toward
the suburbanization of whites that could plausibly account for the
results?
As a final illustration, "maturation" is a factor that often com-
promises the validity of long-term research studies.17 If a seven-year
prison treatment program found that offenders committed fewer crimes
after they left the program than before they went to prison, maturation
-would threaten the validity of the inference that the program was a
success. The results could be due solely to the fact that the offenders
were seven years older when the program ended than they were when
it began, and that older people, whether they receive treatment or not,
commit fewer crimes than younger people. 8
Social scientists design their studies to minimize any factors that
could compromise validity and make the results of the research equivo-
cal or "poorly reasoned."89 Different research designs control for differ-
ent threats to validity. Not only could courts learn to "spot" factors that
might confound the interpretation of research studies, they could also
assess the capacities of various research designs to deal with the issues
noted.
The four research methods most commonly used in research that
comes to the attention of courts are case studies, correlational designs,
88 Cf. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401, 421 n.30 (1st Cir. 1976) (discussing
appellants' suggestion that in attempting to formulate a desegregation plan the court
should consider potential for white flight).
87 See D. CAMPBELL & J. STANLEY, supra note 82, at 5.
11 See Lind, Shapard & Cecil, Methods for Empirical Evaluation of Innovations
in the Justice System, in ExPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW: REPORT OF THE FEDERAL
JUDICIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW 81, 98 (1981).
89 See D. CAMPBELL & J. STANLEY, supra note 82 (discussing threats to valid-
ity); T. COOK & D. CAMPBELL, supra note 82 (same).
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quasi-experimental research, and true experiments. Of the four, case
studies are universally regarded as the least adequate way to design
research.90 The intensive analysis of a specific case illustration, often
used in journalism and biography, is close to useless as a method for
drawing any valid conclusions.9" Case studies cannot guard against any
threat to the validity of the conclusions reached. The most obvious fail-
ing of case studies is the lack of attention to selection bias. There is no
way to know whether the observations made of a given case are repre-
sentative of the observations that would characterize other cases. In-
deed, cases may be chosen for study precisely because they are unusual
(or "interesting"), and, therefore, the cases will not represent the larger
population from which they are drawn.
The other research designs can produce much more valid conclu-
sions. Correlational designs, for example, can establish whether a
change in one factor is associated with a change in another, and may in
some situations provide strong indications of cause-and-effect relation-
ships.92 Correlational studies have long been used in employment dis-
crimination cases to assess the extent to which higher scores on employ-
ment tests correlate positively with better job performance,93 in death
penalty cases to assess whether the execution rate correlates negatively
with the murder rate, 4 and in many other areas of the law.95
Likewise, the various forms of research grouped under the rubric
of "quasi-experimentation"-covering those experiments in which ran-
dom assignments cannot or are not used-can control for many possible
threats to validity. "Time series" designs, for example, in which a fac-
tor is measured at numerous points in time, have been used to deter-
mine the effects of "breathalyzer crackdowns" on reducing the rate of
traffic crashes9" as well as the effects of court-ordered school busing on
residential patterns.97 The time-series design, because it measures the
frequency of a factor, allows inferences to be made regarding whether
90 D. CAMPBELL & J. STANLEY, supra note 82, at 6-7.
91 See id.
92 See id. at 64-66 (explaining that correlation studies may look at the causative
relationship of two or more factors, such as heavy smoking and lung cancer).
" See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425-35 (1975).
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183-87 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 345-54 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
11 See generally D. BARNES, STATISTICS AS PROOF 231-91 (1983) (explaining the
ways in which correlational and other kinds of studies are used to prove factual issues
relevant to legal disputes).
91 See Ross, Law, Science and Accidents: The British Road Safety Act of 1967, 2
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 20-35 (1973) (applying time series data to eliminate a number of
alternative explanations for a reduction in the number of casualties after "breathalyzer
crackdowns").
91 See Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401, 411-15 (1st Cir. 1976).
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the intervention had an effect, or whether the observed data merely re-
flect a trend that pre-dated the intervention.
True experiments surpass other methods of research in their abil-
ity to avoid factors that compromise research validity. True experi-
ments randomly assign participants to the various conditions under
study. Random assignment assures to the maximum extent possible that
the findings obtained are the result of the factor that the researcher
wishes to study, rather than the result of pre-existing differences be-
tween the groups. 8 For example, courts have relied upon true experi-
ments to assess the functioning of juries of various sizes. 9 A second
way that courts could evaluate a piece of social science research, there-
fore, is to ascertain whether other explanations could account for the
results, and, if so, whether the design of the research successfully elimi-
nated any plausible competing explanations.
3. Generalizable Findings
A third factor in determining the precedential value of a case is the
closeness of the analogy between that past case and the present case.
Reasoning by analogy, often viewed as a central tenet of legal reason-
ing, has at least two components. First, and most obviously, courts will
view cases as analogous when the cases involve what appear to be simi-
lar facts-when the prior case is seen as "on point" to the resolution of
the case at bar. 00 Second, all else being equal, if two prior cases have
facts similar to the facts in the present case, courts typically will rely on
the more recent case. The more recent case precedent usually has the
benefit of analyzing how other courts have developed the doctrine an-
nounced in the earlier case. 01 The more recent case precedent is also
more likely to reflect current social and economic conditions. As Wil-
l" See D. CAMPBELL & J. STANLEY, supra note 82, at 13.
99 See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 231-39 (1978) (citing a number of studies
suggesting a positive correlation between group size and the quality of group
performance).
100 See, e.g., S. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING
29 (1985) ("A judge or decision follows precedent when the facts of a previously de-
cided case are sufficiently similar to those of a problem case for justice to require like
treatment of the two cases . . . ."); Liicke, The Common Law: Judicial Impartiality
and Judge-Made Law, 98 LAW Q. REV. 29, 37 (1982) ("Precedents are frequently
applied with a real sense of inevitability, on the seemingly simple ground that the facts
of the precedent and the facts of the case before the court, are indistinguishable. Such
reasoning ... is one of the most prominent stylistic elements of the common
law . . ").
101 See H. BLACK, supra note 71, at 420 ("The earlier cases dealing with a judi-
cial problem are not likely to have discussed it so thoroughly or so intelligently as those
decisions rendered after it has been exhaustively explored by many courts and when the
subject is clearly illuminated by their researches.").
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liam Landes and Richard Posner note, "a decision involving a collision
between two horse-drawn wagons is bound to lose some of its preceden-
tial value when wagons are replaced by cars and trucks."1 °
Translating the legal concept of reasoning by analogy to the con-
text of evaluating social science research is surprisingly smooth. "Gen-
eralization" is the accepted rubric for evaluating how far beyond the
specific facts of the study validly-produced research findings remain
valid. The question of generalization, or "external validity,"' 0 3 presup-
poses that the study was acceptably valid on its own terms, or inter-
nally valid. There is no point in evaluating the scope of application of a
study that is inherently untrustworthy, just as one would not wish to
reason by analogy from a poorly-reasoned legal decision.
While the question of the generalization of social science research,
like the question of whether a legal analogy is compelling, "is never
completely answerable," ' the dimensions that the inquiry must take
have been identified.10 5 They parallel almost precisely the factors courts
commonly consider in ascertaining the precedential pertinence of prior
decisions. In social science, however, the concept of "similar facts" is
refined into two categories: (1) the similarity between the kinds of peo-
ple studied in the research and the kinds of people to which the re-
searcher wishes to generalize, and (2) the similarity between the kinds
of settings or situations investigated and those of current interest.
10 6
In social science, therefore, generalization is assessed across three
dimensions. First, one must consider whether the findings of a social
science study can be generalized across persons. For example, the over-
whelming bulk of social psychological studies on jury decisionmaking,
which have frequently been relied upon by courts,107 employ college
undergraduates as research subjects. To the extent that college under-
graduates are, on average, younger, brighter, and more affluent than
the typical jury population (and if age, intelligence, and socioeconomic
status are related to decisionmaking), the findings of the research have
questionable generalizability to the issue of ultimate interest-how
... Landes & Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19
J. LAW & ECON. 249, 263 (1976).
103 See D. CAMPBELL & J. STANLEY, supra note 82, at 5-6, 16-22; T. COOK &
D. CAMPBELL, supra note 82, at 72.
104 D. CAMPBELL & J. STANLEY, supra note 82, at 79.
105 See id.
108 See T. COOK & D. CAMPBELL, supra note 82, at 73.
107 See, e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323, 332 (1980) (adhering to empirical
studies finding that "a decline in jury size leads to less accurate factfinding and a
greater risk of convicting an innocent person"); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 231-
39 (1978) (noting that studies suggest a positive correlation between group size and the
quality of group performance and productivity).
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"real" juries function. 08
Next, one must consider to what extent a research finding can be
generalized across settings. That is, whether the findings apply in situ-
ations not directly involved in the original study. This issue would
arise, for example, if studies on the effects of voluntary joint custody
were used to predict the effects of mandatory joint custody. 09
The last dimension of generalizability concerns the extent to which
research findings can be generalized over time. Like legal precedent,
research findings can become outdated as circumstances change. A sur-
vey of the kinds of films that members of a community found "patently
offensive" in the 1950's, for example, might have little value in the
context of an obscenity prosecution in the 1980's."O A third way, there-
fore, that courts could evaluate a piece of social science research would
be to gauge the extent to which the people and situations studied in the
research resemble those involved in the controversy at issue, and the
extent to which the passage of time may have attenuated the findings.
4. Supported by a Body of Other Research
Finally, one of the most important indices of the precedential
weight to be accorded a prior decision is the extent to which subsequent
cases have agreed with it."" Decisions followed by many other courts
101 See Weiten & Diamond, A Critical Review of the Jury Simulation Paradigm:
The Case of Defendant Characteristics, 3 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 75-77 (1979). Note
that the studies may be generalizable, but that is a separate empirical question. See
generally Lind & Walker, Theory Testing, Theory Development, and Laboratory Re-
search on Legal Issues, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 5, 5 (1979) (discussing the contribu-
tion to the improvement of legal procedures and processes that could be made by testing
and developing theories of legal behavior in laboratory studies); Monahan & Loftus,
The Psychology of Law, 1982 ANN. REV. PSYCHOLOGY 441, 441-60 (arguing that sim-
ulation research is more appropriate for testing theoretical relationships than for pre-
dicting actual legal decisionmaking).
109 See Scott & Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 455, 484-
88 (1984) (arguing that the growing preference in the law for joint custody arrange-
ments is not supported by empirical research, which has primarily studied voluntary
arrangements).
110 See Glassman, Community Standards of Patent Offensiveness: Public Opinion
Data and Obscenity Law, 42 PuB. OPINION Q. 161 (1978). As another example, ex-
perimental research conducted before 1970 repeatedly found that women were more
persuadable than men. Studies performed since 1970, however, have found few, if any,
gender differences in susceptibility to persuasion. This suggests that "the historical pe-
riod during which some of the experiments are conducted can serve as a powerful inde-
pendent variable." R. ROSNOW & R. ROSENTHAL, UNDERSTANDING BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCE: RESEARCH METHODS FOR RESEARCH CONSUMERS 60 (1984).
"1 See Schaefer, supra note 80, at 11. In reviewing the bases upon which prior
decisions were accorded precedential weight, Justice Schaefer of the Illinois Supreme
Court noted that "[allong with quality, quantity too is significant. A settled course of
decision is more compelling than an isolated precedent." Id.; see also R. CROSS, supra
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receive the most searching form of independent review. The greater the
number of courts that cite and rely upon a decision, the less likely it is
that the decision contains some hidden flaw that, if discovered, would
lead to a different result.
A similar situation exists with respect to scientific research. The
trustworthiness of a study increases as independent investigators arrive
at a common conclusion. The more often a study is confirmed by subse-
quent research, the less likely it is that chance fluctuations in the data
accounted for the results of the original research.
For example, a single study that a particular prison treatment pro-
gram produced no rehabilitative effect would be interesting and indicate
the need for further research. But, in itself, the study would not under-
mine reliance upon offender rehabilitation as a principal justification of
criminal sentencing. Perhaps the study was poorly done, or the ob-
served data masked a real rehabilitative effect of the program. It is also
possible that while the particular treatment studied did not have an
effect on offender recidivism, other treatments would have some effect.
However, when several hundred studies have examined the rehabilita-
tive effect of a wide variety of correctional treatments, and virtually all
of them conclude that receiving treatment bore no relationship to
whether people commit crimes when released from prison, one can be
much more confident in the empirical assertion that there are no
proven methods for rehabilitating criminal offenders.112 Thus, the final
way that courts can evaluate a piece of social science 'research is to
determine whether other studies have yielded congruent findings.
5. The Limits of Judicial Competence
The proposals we present for the evaluation of social science re-
search by courts are intended to serve only as guidelines. Our proposals
structure the dimensions along which courts should evaluate research,
but they do not direct the judicial thumb to be turned up or down on
any given research study.11 Courts cannot apply the guidelines
note 47, at 207-18 (discussing the use of precedent in defining legal rules and judicial
discretion); A. GOODHART, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAw 23-25
(1934) (examining the extent to which precedent is a binding force in English law);
Merryman, supra note 36, at 624 (discussing the value of applying "accumulated wis-
dom" from previous decisions involving similar problems to the problem at issue).
11 For empirical research on the rehabilitation of criminals, see NEW DIREC-
TIONS IN THE REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS (S. Martin, L. Sechrest &
R. Redner eds. 1981); THE REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS: PROBLEMS
AND PROSPECTS (L. Sechrest, S. White & E. Brown eds. 1979).
118 Under our guidelines, the minimal level at which a research study must "per-
form" in order to be used in formulating a rule of law may vary with the legal stan-
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mechanically, adding "points" for random assignment and subtracting
"points" for plausible hypotheses left untested. That a study was
funded by a government agency, published in a refereed journal, or
favorably reviewed in print by other social scientists, does not guarantee
that the findings are trustworthy. Yet compared to research that does
not possess indicia of surviving critical review by the scientific commu-
nity, one can generally expect research so reviewed to be of higher em-
pirical quality. Courts can, therefore, use such research with greater
confidence.
It would be foolish to suggest that all social science studies can be
evaluated adequately by reference to a simple checklist of threats to
validity and a short catalogue of how various research designs neutral-
ize those threats. Even a crude screening device to evaluate the validity
of research studies, however, can go far in reducing a court's reliance
upon inadequate empirical data. For example, simply appreciating that
case studies do not provide scientific validation of cause-and-effect rela-
tionships could reduce much of the inappropriate reference to social
science data that is found in court opinions."1 4
The fundamental objection that can be raised to any scheme that
requires courts to evaluate social science research is that serious errors
will be made in the evaluations. Armed with little knowledge, either
courts will rely on research containing undetected flaws, or they will
discount meritorious studies. In either case, a rule of law may come to
be premised on an erroneous empirical foundation. Commentators have
argued that the likelihood of such obviously undesirable outcomes, par-
ticularly when courts locate research material on their own initiative, is
sufficient to justify some means of providing judges with expert assis-
tance in evaluating research. The two most frequent proposals are for
the court to notify the parties of its intention to rely upon a research
study,"'6 thereby bringing the parties and their experts into the evalua-
tion process, or for the court to have access to its own scientific
advisors.11 '
dard of review applicable in the case. Studies used to support the rationality of a legis-
lative action may not suffice to demonstrate an important or a compelling state interest.
See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW §§ 16.2-16.4, at 994-1002
(1978) (contrasting the Supreme Court's approach to legislative action under the mere
rationality and strict scrutiny tests).
114 The Supreme Court's use of a psychoanalytic case study to provide empirical
support for the proposition that "sexually exploited children are unable to develop
healthy affectionate relationships later in life" serves as a recent example of courts'
inappropriate reliance on case studies. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 n.9
(1982) (upholding a New York antipornography statute).
115 See Davis, Facts, supra note 18, at 376, 409 n.94.
1 The recommendation that courts have science advisors has a long history. See,
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We believe that this issue cannot be resolved in the abstract.
Whether courts can use the template we have provided to evaluate re-
search for themselves, or whether, in order to avoid erroneous evalua-
tions, courts must obtain expert assistance, depends upon both the par-
ticular judge doing the evaluation and the particular piece of research
being evaluated.117
For example, studies that, upon initial judicial review, do not
e.g., Glueck, The Social Sciences and Scientific Method in the Administration of Jus-
tice, 167 ANNALS 106 (1933). Glueck suggested that
under the auspices of some such organization as an outstanding university
or the American Law Institute, there might be established a clearing
house .... The goal of such an enterprise would be to keep lawmakers,
law interpreters, and law reformers continuously informed of the progress
of thought and experience in those fields of human endeavor with which
legislators, lawyers, and judges have to deal.
Id. at 115-16; see also Currie, Appellate Courts Use of Facts Outside of the Record by
Resort to Judicial Notice and Independent Investigation, 1960 Wis. L. REv. 39. Cur-
rie points out that
the simplest method of making a judicial investigation of social and eco-
nomic facts, which the court deems to be material on an issue of constitu-
tionality or the adoption by the court of a rule of law, is to remand the
same to the trial court for the taking of evidence. However, another
method is open. Such is the appointment as a special master or an expert
in a particular field of specialized knowledge to investigate certain scien-
tific facts and report his conclusion to the court.
Id. at 49.
4rthur Miller and Jerome Barron make five suggestions "for improving the
method of dealing with the independent development of legislative fact and legal doc-
trine by the Supreme Court." Miller & Barron, supra note 25, at 1233. The sugges-
tions are as follows: (1) remand for trial court adjudication of legislative fact; (2) adop-
tion of rules for judicial notice of legislative facts; (3) appointment of a panel of resident
social scientists; (4) licensing the Supreme Court bar; and (5) requests by the Supreme
Court for further information on questions of legislative fact. See id. at 1233-45. As
Thomas Marvell notes, however, in discussing such special procedures, "These sugges-
tions are often made, but the procedures are rarely if ever used at the courts studied
[nor] apparently at other courts as well." T. MARVELL, supra note 35, at 192.
" Much of the research cited by courts today would be easily dismissed if our
guidelines were applied with any rigor. If the Supreme Court had applied the guide-
lines in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), for example, none of the "experi-
ments" the Court cited as supporting its conclusion that there were "no discernible
differences," 399 U.S. at 101, between six- and twelve-person juries would have passed
muster. The Court would have been spared the criticism that its empirical scholarship
"would not win a passing grade in a high school psychology class." Saks, Ignorance of
Science is No Excuse, TRIAL, Nov.-Dec. 1974, at 18; see also Zeisel & Diamond,
"Convincing Empirical Evidence" on the Six Member Jury, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 281,
292 (1974) ("The flaws in these studies are ...not complex and surely not beyond
the reach of modest expertise."). At the other extreme, application of the guidelines
could increase the confidence of courts in relying upon methodologically exemplary
studies, as the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the Arizona Supreme Court, and the
California Supreme Court recently did in evaluating studies on eyewitness identifica-
tion. See U.S. v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985); Arizona v. Chapple, 135
Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983); People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 690 P.2d 709,
208 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1984).
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unambiguously constitute authority for the case before the court require
further and more methodologically sophisticated scrutiny before being
discarded or embraced. Whether a judge should personally undertake
this more detailed inquiry depends upon the competence that the indi-
vidual judge brings to the task of evaluating empirical research,11 or
upon the amount of effort that the judge is willing to invest in gaining
such competence.1 9
118 One commentator has noted that
[t]he single most important barrier to the use of social science research in
the practice of law is ignorance .... [I]gnorance of the social sciences
leaves lawyers ill-equipped to evaluate social science research. As a result,
many attorneys are unable to distinguish sound research from weak re-
search, and consequently are reluctant to use social science research at all.
Lochner, Some Limits on the Application of Social Science Research in the Legal Pro-
cess, 5 LAW & SOC. ORD. 815, 824 (1973).
The increasing number of law schools and post-graduate judicial education pro-
grams offering courses in law and social science, and the burgeoning literature on social
science tailored to a legal audience may foreshadow a gradual, but nonetheless discern-
ible, increase in judicial sophistication in this area. For discussions of the increasing use
of social science in the law, see D. BARNES, supra note 95; N. CHANNELS, SOCIAL
SCIENCE METHODS IN THE LEGAL PROCESS (1985); EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW:
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EXPERI-
MENTATION IN THE LAW (1981); W. LOH, SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE JUDICIAL PRO-
CESS: CASES, READINGS, AND TEXT (1984); J. MONAHAN & L. WALKER, supra note
4; D. VINSON & P. ANTHONY, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH METHODS FOR LITIGA-
TION (1985); Meador, The Graduate Degree Program for Judges at the University of
Virginia, 22 JUDGES' J. 19 (1983); Monahan & Walker, Teaching Social Science in
Law: An Alternative to "Law and Society," 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 478 (1985).
19 Acquiring the knowledge of social science necessary to evaluate most research
studies is no more difficult than acquiring the knowledge of economics necessary to
adjudicate many antitrust cases or the knowledge of chemistry necessary to resolve
much environmental litigation. Anyone who can comprehend the Federal Tort Claims
Act can learn what standard deviation and statistical significance mean. One commen-
tator has noted that
law professors, lawyers, and judges have, for a long time, learned and used
technical vocabularies which have developed outside the law. If a lawyer
can learn the difference between his gluteus maximus and his femur for
purposes of a tort case, there is no reason why he cannot learn the differ-
ence between a chi-square test and a Spearman correlation
coefficient ...
Nor is the methodology of the social sciences impossible to under-
stand, as some critics charge. Although a good deal of social science meth-
odology is difficult to grasp-statistical testing, for example-even these
subjects can be mastered with some effort.
Lochner, supra note 118, at 826 (footnotes omitted).
Judge Roger Robb has observed that "[a] lawyer who is worth his salt and sits on
a circuit court of appeals, if he puts his mind to it and studies long and hard enough,
can master it and get at least an understanding of most technical problems." Hearings
Before the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System 830 (1975),
quoted in T. MARVELL, supra note 35, at 374. Justice Traynor has expressed similar
sentiments, arguing that
[w]e need not distrust judicial scrutiny of . . . extralegal materials. The
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Furthermore, if courts adopt our proposals for evaluating social
science research, the litigating parties will be quick to frame their em-
pirical arguments along the dimensions suggested by the guidelines.
The guidelines would lead the parties to detail the nature of critical
review, argue the validity of research methods, assess the general-
izability of findings, and marshall the support of additional research.
Thus, the active participation of the parties should go far in lightening
the burden of judicial evaluation.
Under our proposals there undeniably will be occasions when rele-
vant research is before a court, but the complexity of the research will
exceed the methodological competence that the evaluating judge pos-
sesses or can reasonably be expected to acquire. At this point, but only
at this point, the risk of error is such that, as a last resort, some method
of providing assistance to the court in evaluating the research must be
found.120 Notice to the parties and the use of court-appointed advisors
or special masters are among options for providing this assistance. The
social authority perspective is indifferent as to which option should be
chosen.
C. Establishing Social Authority
Finally, we must consider a special issue in evaluating social sci-
ence research: How should a court evaluate a study that another court
has already evaluated? Studies of first impression may be evaluated as
we propose, but additional considerations arise when another court pre-
viously has relied upon, or rejected, a particular piece of research. If
the research has been evaluated by a court in another jurisdiction, the
very independence of judges, fostered by judicial office even when not
guaranteed by tenure, and their continuous adjustment of sight to varied
problems tend to develop in the least of them some skill in the evaluation
of massive data. They learn to detect latent quackery in medicine, to ques-
tion doddered scientific findings, to edit the swarm spore of the social
scientists, to add grains of salt to the fortune-telling statistics of the
economists.
Traynor, Reasoning in a Circle of Law, 56 VA. L. REv. 739, 750 (1970).
120 See Isaacs, The Law and the Facts, 22 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1922). Isaacs
argues that
some of the general facts needed in the decision of technical questions are
so highly complicated that it is hopeless to expect to instruct even the most
intelligent judge in the course of a single case to the extent necessary to
enable him to come to an accurate conclusion. At least, if the court is not
made up of specialists, it ought to have the aid of special investigators
capable of subjecting the evidence on general facts . . . to the same degree
of scrutiny that the far less important and less difficult special facts are




evaluation of the former court may be treated much as its conclusions of
law are treated. That is, its value as precedent could' be determined
according to the guidelines we have developed. Yet, what of research
that has been evaluated by a court in the same jurisdiction as the court
presently reviewing it? The issue arises often, and in two legally dis-
tinct situations.
1. The Effect of Lower Court Evaluation of Social Science
Research upon Appellate Courts
If empirical studies are considered to be matters of fact, appellate
courts would appear to be bound by lower court evaluations of the
studies, at least if the lower court evaluations were not "clearly errone-
ous." As discussed in Part I, appellate courts commonly resort to the
distinction between legislative facts and adjudicative facts to avoid the
untenable result of being bound by two inconsistent lower court evalua-
tions of the same research, neither of which is "clearly erroneous."
Lower court findings of adjudicative facts, according to this view, are
not reviewable on appeal (unless clearly erroneous), but lower court
findings of legislative facts are reviewable. 1
21
We reach the same result, but by a more parsimonious route.
121 See supra text accompanying notes 26-36. This question was considered in
Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1983), a case involving whether a
Mississippi statute that banned liquor advertising violated the first amendment. One
trial court had found that the statute did violate the first amendment, see Lamar Out-
door Advertising v. Mississippi State Tax Comm'n, 539 F. Supp. 817 (S.D. Miss.
1982), and another trial court found that it did not, see Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 489
F. Supp. 763 (N.D. Miss. 1980). Writing for the court of appeals in Dunagin, Judge
Reavley noted that
[t]he degree to which an appellate court should defer to the "fact" findings
of a trial judge as to the latest truths in the social sciences is an interesting
question.. . . The Lamar Outdoor Advertising court's finding that ad-
vertising restrictions do not directly advance the state's interest since there
is no scientifically concrete link between advertising and alcohol consump-
tion sounds very much like a finding of fact. Should this finding be subject
to a clearly erroneous standard of review? Clearly not.
[T]he issue of whether there is a correlation between advertising and
consumption is a legislative and not an adjudicative fact question. It is not
a question specifically related to this one case or controversy; it is a ques-
tion of social factors and happenings which may submit to some partial
empirical solution but is likely to remain subject to opinion and reasoning.
718 F.2d at 748 n.8.
However, not all courts are in accord. See, e.g., Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407
A.2d 626 (D.C. App. 1979) (finding an appellate court's reevaluation of social science
studies that had been introduced at trial to be improper). In response to the dissent's
criticism in Ibn-Tamas of the sample size used in one study, the majority stated, "We
do not understand the basis on which an appellate judge can make a de novo determi-
nation here." Id. at 639 n.25.
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Since appellate courts are not bound by lower ourts' conclusions of
law, they should not be bound by lower courts' conclusions regarding
empirical research. A reviewing court is completely free to evaluate de
novo any precedent used in a lower court decision. 122 Similarly, the
court should be unconstrained in its ability to reevaluate any social sci-
ence research upon which a lower court relied in creating a rule of law.
A court, for example, should have the discretion to find a study cited by
a lower court insufficiently valid or generalizable, and, conversely,
should be empowered to find methodological virtue in a piece of re-
search dismissed by the court below. Indeed, it is precisely the author-
ity-of whatever sort-relied upon by the lower court that the appel-
late court has the obligation to review.
2. The Effect of Appellate Court Evaluation of Social Science
Research upon Lower Courts
In his descriptive study of several courts, Thomas Marvell found
that when judges referenced social science, they tended to rely heavily
upon studies that had been cited approvingly by higher courts, particu-
larly by the United States Supreme Court. 2 ' As a jurisprudential mat-
ter, however, should an appellate court's endorsement or repudiation of
a scientific authority affect lower courts' judgments? Considering scien-
tific research as a type of fact is of no assistance in resolving this ques-
tion, since appellate courts do not make findings of fact except in those
122 See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 64, at 852-53.
123 See T. MARVELL, supra note 35. Marvell found that, in one state supreme
court in 1972, one of every seven "social facts" mentioned in majority opinions was in a
quotation from a prior opinion, usually of the United States Supreme Court or the state
supreme court itself. According to Marvell, "Social facts found in opinions very likely
have an aura of authenticity that leads judges to accept them more readily and that
makes them more presentable in opinions." Id. at 184. More than one-fourth of the
social facts mentioned in attorneys' briefs to the state supreme court were from prior
opinions, "but an interesting point is that most of the attorneys' quoted social facts
were in opinions from other states and lower federal courts, whereas the judges seldom
quoted social facts from such opinions, probably because they are considered far less
authoritative than its own or Supreme Court opinions." T. MARVELL, supra note 35,
at 184; see also Perry & Melton, Precedential Value ofJudicial Notice of Social Facts:
Parham as an Example, 22 J. FAM. LAW 633 (1984). Gail Perry and Gary Melton
commented that
[i]t seems probable that social facts found in judicial opinions, especially in
Supreme Court opinions, have an aura of authenticity that leads to greater
judicial acceptance and makes them more presentable in opinions. Indeed,
where a particular fact construction seems basic to a higher court's line of
argument, lower courts may find it difficult to follow the principle of stare





rare instances when they find lower courts to have been clearly in error
in determining the facts. Consistent with our position on social author-
ity, we suggest that appellate courts' evaluation of social science re-
search should affect lower courts to the same extent that their evalua-
tion of case precedent affects lower courts.
To say that lower courts should be influenced by the conclusions
that appellate courts have derived from social science research in the
same way that they are influenced by the rules that the courts abstract
from prior cases, however, does not mean that lower courts need be
merely passive recipients of the empirical judgments issued above.""
Just as new legal cases and commentary can develop and recast a given
rule of law, so too new research and analysis-not previously consid-
ered by an appellate court-can change the empirical conclusions upon
which a rule of law rests.
Consider, in this regard, Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in
United States v. Leon. 25 At issue was whether the exclusionary rule in
criminal cases should be modified to allow the admission of evidence
seized by the police in good faith reliance upon a search warrant later
proved to be defective. After reaffirming that the Fourth Amendment
did not compel the exclusionary rule, the majority used many existing
social science studies to reach the judgment that the costs of barring
evidence seized in good faith in terms of prosecutions lost exceeded the
benefits in terms of police misconduct deterred.
126
Justice Blackmun found that the majority had made the correct
empirical judgment "on the information before it," but wrote separately
to stress that "any empirical judgment about the effect of the exclusion-
ary rule in a particular class of cases necessarily is a provisional
one." 127 The empirical assumptions upon which the decision rested, he
wrote, will
now .. .be tested in the real world ...and this Court
will attend to the results. If it should emerge from experi-
124 Lower courts can distinguish a study relied on by an appellate court by show-
ing that its present use in the case at bar serves a different purpose than the one for
which it was previously employed. Lower courts also can take the position that the
reference to empirical research in appellate court opinions is merely dicta. See Perry &
Melton, supra note 123, at 664. Finally, lower courts can point out in their own dicta
that they believe the higher court erred in its empirical judgment. See United States v.
Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 804 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring) (stating that, although
the Supreme Court had previously indicated its belief to the contrary, "[ilt is most
doubtful ...whether anyone can now demonstrate that children's reading or looking
at obscene matter has a probable causal relation to the children's anti-social conduct").
125 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3423 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
126 Id. at 3413 n.6.
127 Id. at 3424 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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ence that, contrary to our expectations, the good faith excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule results in a material change in
police compliance with the Fourth Amendment, we shall
have to reconsider what we have undertaken .... 128
We go further: not only should a court be able to modify its own
empirical conclusions as new research becomes available,29 but a lower
court should be able to reach empirical conclusions that differ from
those of an appellate court when it has obtained new research not pre-
viously before the reviewing court.1 30
CONCLUSION
The critical test of whether social science research used to create a
legal rule is better analogized to fact or law should be pragmatic. The
classification which most fairly and efficiently provides for obtaining,
evaluating, and establishing social science in court should be adopted.
We have argued that the law analogy works better than the fact anal-
ogy in responding to these central questions. Our view is necessarily
speculative since courts now universally view social science research as
a type of fact. Only the experience of courts that adopt a social author-
ity perspective will determine whether the theory has value. We believe
128 Id.
129 See id.; see also People v. Charles Schweinler Press, 214 N.Y. 395, 108 N.E.
639 (1915) (validating a legislative act barring women from night work). The New
York Court of Appeals, recognizing the importance of a 400-page Brandeis brief dis-
cussing the negative effects of night work on women, reversed a prior decision and
sustained a statute prohibiting night work for women. The court stated that
[tihere is no reason why we should be reluctant to give effect to new and
additional knowledge upon such a subject as this, even if it did lead us to
take a different view of such a vastly important question as that of public
health or disease than formerly prevailed.
Id. at 411-12, 108 N.E. at 644.
30 There is some precedent for a lower court engaging in the anticipatory over-
ruling of a higher court decision where that decision is predicated on an empirical
circumstance that has changed over time. Courts and commentators have offered princi-
pled reasons for refusing to follow higher court precedent. See, e.g., Pouquette v.
O'Brien, 55 Ariz. 248, 100 P.2d 979 (1940) (stating that the reasoning of the United
States Supreme Court was such that if the question at issue were presented before it
now, a contrary result would be reached); Note, Lower Court Disavowal of Supreme
Court Precedent, 60 VA. L. REv. 494 (1974) (examining when lower courts should be
permitted to discard Supreme Court precedent); Comment, Stare Decisis in Lower
Courts: Predicting the Demise of Supreme Court Precedent, 60 WASH. L. REv. 87
(1985) (discussing circumstances in which it is justifiable for lower courts to refuse to
follow Supreme Court precedent). The higher court, of course, can then review the
lower court decision, including the new empirical information upon which its rule of
law rests. As we have stated, the higher court would not be bound by the lower court's
evaluation of the research, and therefore would be free to reinstate its original rule of
law. See supra text accompanying note 122.
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that if courts treat social science research as social authority, fewer ju-
dicial opinions will rely upon social science material, but the material
that is used will be of much higher quality. Poor studies will be
screened out, and exemplary research will become more apparent. In
this way, the development of fair and efficient rules of law that rely in
part upon empirical propositions will be facilitated.

